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Abstract: 
 
The paper reports on a theoretical framework for the study of the influence of globalisation on individual 
decision-making. The focus is on individual co-operative behaviour for the provision of public goods. 
First, I summarise relevant theories of globalisation and co-operation aiming to find a link between the 
two themes. Second, I illustrate the methodology of the research project “Globalisation, Co-operation and 
Trust: An Experimental Study”, which will carry out an international study on the subject. Finally, I 
report on some preliminary results from a pilot study of the project. The explanandum is individual 
propensity to co-operate measured in experiments of nested public goods problem. The main explanatory 
variables are four dimensions of individual access into globalisation processes, derived from a 
questionnaire. Of these four dimensions, the cultural and the social dimension of globalisation appear to 
have a strong explanatory power on individual co-operation rates, although they have different signs. The 
other two dimensions, economic and political, do not seem to have comprehensive explanatory power. 
The relationship with social identity is also analysed. 
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WHICH RELATION BETWEEN GLOBALISATION AND INDIVIDUAL PROPENSITY TO  
CO-OPERATE? 
SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
 
 
We can easily now conceive of a time 
when there will be only one culture 
and one civilization on the entire 
surface of the earth. I don’t believe this 
will happen, because there are 
contradictory tendencies always at 
work - on the one hand towards 
homogenization and on the other 
towards new distinctions”. 
(Claude Levi-Strauss, 1978: 20) 
 
1 Int roduct ion  
In spite of the rapid growth in research on globalisation, most of the studies seem thus 
far to have taken a “macro” approach, for instance investigating the impact of economic 
globalisation on a country’s economic performance (e.g. Collier and Dollar, 2002), or on its 
poverty levels and income inequality (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 2002). The same seems to be true for 
other social sciences1. Some (partial) exceptions are those studies that have looked at how 
social factors like culture and identity ‘matter’ for individual economic decisions (Henrich et al., 
2004; Inglehart, 2003; Akerlof, 1997). By stressing the diversity of behaviour among societies at 
different stages of economic development and historical evolution, some of these studies have 
implicitly hinted at the role that globalisation may play through reshaping those factors. 
However, studies systematically investigating the influence of globalisation on individuals’ 
behaviour in their day-to-day decision-making, seem at this stage to be lacking. 
The aim of this paper is to help bridge this gap, and investigate the complex relations 
among globalisation on the one hand, and individual decision-making on the other. The type of 
interaction analysed is co-operation problems for the provision of public goods. This focus is 
                                                 
1 Political scientists have typically focussed on the collective action of e.g. social movements in relation to 
globalisation; among countless examples of works of this kind, see for instance Castells (2004), for political 
resistance movements to globalisation; Falk, (1992) and Scholte (2000a) for ‘global’ civil society. Beck (1986) 
and Bauman (1998) analyse the reactions of individuals vis-à-vis globalisation from a sociological viwpoint; 
their angle is nonetheless on the relationship between an individual and the society as a whole, rather than 
among different individuals in specific contexts of interaction. 
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justified by the heightened importance of public goods at the various levels of human 
interactions, be they at the global2, national, or local level. The essential question that is 
addressed is what influence the process of globalisation has on co-operation towards the 
provision of public goods at each of these levels. 
This paper is part of the research project “Globalisation, Co-operation and Trust: An 
Experimental Study”, (GCT hereafter) which will carry out an international study on the subject. 
This research project was launched by CSGR in spring 2004, and has brought together an 
interdisciplinary and international network of researchers3. Thanks to funds obtained by the 
National Science Foundation, a first wave of the research will be carried out in Argentina, Italy, 
Iran, Russia, South Africa, and the United States. 
The primary goal of the project is to establish the existence of a relation between 
globalisation and individual propensity to co-operate from the empirical point of view. More 
precisely, we shall try to answer this question using the methodology developed in experimental 
economics. In experiments individuals are involved in ‘controlled’ situations of social 
interactions, which take place in isolated environments that are similar to laboratories in the 
natural sciences. Subjects are faced with monetary incentives, so that their ‘observed’ 
behaviour will typically be a decision on how to allocate a sum of money, provided by the 
experimenter, among different options. The structure of the payoffs and the design of the social 
interactions are intended to ‘measure’ individual preferences rigorously, as well as their changes 
in response to manipulations of the social environment4.  
The subjects who will take part in this research are involved in interactions that are 
modelled on Public Goods Games (PGGs). This is the typical situation used across a number of 
disciplines to pit self-interest against co-operation for the common good. In the experiments, 
participants will be playing these PGGs, and paid the real earnings that result, with people from 
                                                 
2 Co-operation to achieve the provision of global public goods has increasingly been seen as crucial to the 
growth of local and global prosperity (as discussed in the agenda set by the UN Millennium Development 
Goals). Such are those public goods that transcend national borders, such as the environment, public health, 
international justice, and international financial stability (e.g. Kaul et al. (2003)). 
3 Gianluca Grimalda (CSGR) launched the project, and is co-leader with Professor Nancy Buchan (University 
of South Carolina, Business); Professor Marilynn Brewer (Ohio State University, Psichology); Dr Margaret 
Foddy (Carleton University, Sociology and Anthropology); Professor Enrique Fatàs (Valencia University, 
Economics); Professor Rick Wilson (Rice University, Political Science) are part of the core research team. 
Other collaborators are Syed Ahasn (Concordia University, Economics), Fatemeh Bagherian (Tehran 
University, psychology), Iain Edwards (Monash University, South Africa, history), Saul Keifman (Universidad 
de Buenos Aires, economics), Francis Matambalya (University of Dar es Salaam, business), Luigi Mittone 
(University of Trento, economics), David Schrieber (University of Wisconsin, business).   
4 See e.g. Kagel and Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003), for introductory books on experimental and 
behavioural economics. 
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their own local area, from another area in their own country, and from different countries around 
the world. In this way, the tension between co-operating to increase local welfare and co-
operating to increase overall global welfare is made salient for individuals. 
If co-operation propensities are – in this methodology - ‘measured’ by subjects’ 
behaviour in experiments, the impact of globalisation is primarily appraised through a 
questionnaire that subjects complete at the end of the experiment. Various questions assess 
subjects’ participation in global relations. These vary to comprise the economic, social, cultural, 
and political areas of relations. Indexes of individual access to, and also exclusion from, 
globalisation are then constructed on the basis of subjects’ answers to the questionnaire. These 
are then used to assess their relationship with subjects’ experimental behaviour. The 
questionnaire also addresses a range of possible mediating factors of globalisation on individual 
decision-making, such as individuals’ social identity and attachment to the local, the national 
and the global community. Other factors, such as subjects’ values, attitudes towards 
globalisation, and some cultural aspects of the societies wherein they live, are also addressed in 
the questionnaire. Other statistical sources are used for explanatory factors that cannot be 
included in the questionnaire, such as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in the area where 
subjects live. 
Section 2 of the paper seeks to conceptualize the relation between globalisation and 
individual decision-making in co-operative problems5. In particular, after an analysis of 
definitions of globalisation and of theories of co-operation, an attempt is made to identify the 
possible links between these two. This is done first in relation to rational choice accounts of co-
operation based on the idea of reciprocity. I then discuss various theories of social identity, and 
of their change vis-à-vis globalisation. These vary from the cosmopolitan idea that people 
expand the community to which they are attached to the whole humankind (Hannerz, 1992; 
Held, 1995), to the opposite view that individuals entrench even further to the local level 
(Castells, 2004) as an effect of globalisation. Since the relevance of one’s identification with a 
group is seen as central in many theories of co-operation, the reshaping of social identity is 
                                                 
5 As mentioned above, this paper is part of the GCT project, which sees the collaboration of several 
researchers. See note 3. In particular, the framework that has been developed is joint work of the research 
team, whereas the analysis of the results from a pilot study is my own. More precisely, section 3 is entirely the 
outcome of joint work with other team members, as well as the questionnaire reported in the appendix. 
Section 2 is mainly the result of my theoretical investigations in the fields of globalisation, social norms, and 
social identity, although the presentation also draws substantially on discussions with other research team 
members, and on some materials taken from funds application presented to NSF. Finally, sections 4 and 5 are 
entirely the results of my own analysis, as well as the index construction reported in the Appendix. I have 
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obviously a relevant channel whereby globalisation influences co-operative behaviour. Other 
possible mechanisms, such as the change in social and cultural norms of behaviour in a given 
society, will only briefly be sketched out, given the difficulty of grasping changes at the meso-
level within a research that focuses on the individual level. However, questions from the World 
Value Survey are included to control for these aspect. 
Section 3 reports more specifically on the methodology of the research. Section 4 
reports some empirical results from a pilot study carried out at the end of October 2005. Since 
the purpose of this study was to check the validity of the experimental design and the suitability 
of the questionnaire, the results derived from them cannot be generalised. In particular, the fact 
that the sample selection procedure did not aim to recruit people from the general public, and 
the too limited a number of observations represent their major limitations. Bearing this in mind, 
however, some of the patterns that emerge in this pilot study seem worth commenting. In 
particular, relevant country effects seem to emerge, with behaviour in the US leading to higher 
co-operation rates than in Spain. Second, access into globalisation appears to be a good 
predictor of experimental behaviour. Interestingly enough, various dimensions seem to bring 
about contrasting effects on individual actions. The cultural dimension of globalisation seems to 
have the strongest influence, and this goes in the direction of reducing an individual’s co-
operation rate. In particular, subjects who are ‘culturally globalised’ seem, ceteris paribus, to 
discriminate against the groups at the higher level than the local, that is, the national and the 
global group. The social aspect of globalisation seems instead to move in the opposite direction, 
leading to higher co-operation rates, and favouring the higher order group, though at a lower 
significance level. The political dimension of globalisation is only marginally significant for some 
aspects of the interactions, whereas economic globalisation never turns out to affect behaviour 
– though some effects emerge when subjects’ income is controlled for. Social identity seems to 
account for subjects’ behaviour mostly at the local level of interaction. Other explanatory factors, 
such as exclusion from globalisation, the presence of anti-foreign sentiments, and the type of 
culture, do not seem to exert significant influence on behaviour. Section 5 draws some 
preliminary conclusions, and highlights the topics that seem to deserve further attention in the 
next stages of the research. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
tried to make clear when what I am reporting  is either my own contribution or contribution from the group 
by using either the first person singular or the first person plural. 
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2 Theoret ica l  Framework 
Offering a complete review of globalisation theories obviously lies beyond the objectives 
of this paper. The aim of this section is mainly to clarify the basic concepts underlying the 
theoretical framework of the project. 
2.1 Globalisation  
Most theories of globalisation hint at the transcendence – or compression - of space in 
human relations as the distinctive feature of globalisation. That is, the crux of globalisation is 
seen in the progressive elimination of physical boundaries to such relations. This is made 
possible by several factors. Technological progress has created networks of communication that 
completely transcend space and time. Drastic reductions in transport costs facilitate both trading 
activities and delocalisation of production on the economic side, and people migrations on the 
social side. Political events are capable of affecting at the same time people living in different 
parts of the world. The intensification of economic activities poses ‘threats’, e.g. to the 
environment, on a planetary scale. The range of activities that is affected by these changes is 
so broad that nearly all spheres of human relations are likely to be influenced. One could note 
that some of the factors of change have taken place in the very recent past, whereas others 
have been continuing for centuries. Although dealing with the question of the ‘timing’ of 
globalisation is rather unimportant for this research, this points to the difficulties implicit in 
comprehending such a multi-faceted concept. 
Even if the question of distance is certainly central to globalisation, various theories differ 
on the emphasis they put upon it. Early definitions did not offer particular qualifications to this 
notion, but referred generically to “the intensification of worldwide social relations linking distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away 
and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990: 27). Other conceptualisations have in turn emphasised the 
necessity of these links to be transnational (e.g. Beck, 2000), and then transcontinental (Held et 
al., 1999). Other theorists (e.g. Scholte, 2000: Chapter 2) go a step forward in arguing that the 
nature of globalisation is better captured by the idea of ‘deterritorialization’ – or ‘supra-
territorialization’ - of human relations. He thus discusses globalisation as “the spread of 
transplanetary and […] supraterritorial connections between people. From this perspective, 
globalisation involves reduction in barriers to transworld contacts.  People become more able – 
physically, legally, culturally, and psychologically – to engage with each other in ‘one world’.” 
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(Scholte, 2002: 13-4). In this sense, globalisation differs from the notions of internationalisation, 
westernisation, universalisation, and liberalisation, which have been proposed by others as the 
crux of globalisation.  
The notion of supra-territoriality seems to offer a more solid theoretical background than 
other characterisations, and so it will be used in the rest of the analysis as the main theoretical 
benchmark. However, some further qualifications are both possible and necessary, especially 
considering that the unit of analysis of this research is at the individual level. First, one of the 
aspects that seems particularly relevant for the aims of our research is that of individual 
connectedness in supra-territorial relations. Not only has globalisation determined a change in 
the number and scale of an individual’s connections, but also it has modified their nature. In 
particular, the so-called ‘Information Technology (IT) revolution’, has made it possible for people 
to enter in relations with each other through networks, and not merely by means of one-way or 
two-way relations. The consequences of these changes on social relations and their 
distinctiveness for globalisation has been pointed out by many authors, and has been 
extensively studied. For instance, Castells (2003) talks about a ‘network society’. Others refer to 
‘globalism’ as a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental 
distance (Keohane and Nye Jr., 2000), and point out the aspect of ‘complexity’ associated with 
such networks (Tomlison, 2003). The scale and the type of inter-connections will play a crucial 
part in our research, as in fact one of the most important factors in the construction of a scale for 
the individual access into globalisation will be given by the individual’s degree of connectedness 
in supra-territorial relations. 
A second aspect that seems particularly relevant for our research is that which has been 
referred to as the“intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992), 
or of the earth as humanity’s home (Scholte, 2000). Again, technological changes and the 
diffusion of communication media active on a world scale play an important part in this (e.g. 
Held et al., 1999: Chapter 7). However, this is not merely the result of technical change, but is 
also a consequence of the growing interdependence among people and activities, which makes 
events and actions taking place at one side of the globe become relevant for people living at the 
other side. Moreover, global instances like threats to the environment or the inter-planetary 
spread of epidemics, give rise to a sense of a common fate for the humanity as a whole. As 
Giddens argues, with globalisation ‘humankind becomes a “we”, facing problems and 
opportunities where there are no “others” ’. (Giddens, 1991: 27). This perception of the ‘world-
as-a-whole’ seems to be a peculiar characteristic of contemporary times. Clearly, in the past 
there have been examples of individuals having a vision that arrived to encompass the whole 
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world. But this seems to be an exception, limited to the very few, rather than the rule. For 
instance, a survey carried out by the UNESCO in the 1960s found that more than 70% of the 
people sampled were not aware of events taking place outside of their place of residence 
(Tomlison, 2003). One is on safe grounds when saying that this proportion must be significantly 
higher today. The very large diffusion of the term globalisation has undoubtedly played a part in 
this, too, which is but one example of the reflexivity of the notion of globalisation. In our 
theoretical setting, such a heightened consciousness of the ‘single world’ will be considered not 
merely as a consequence of globalisation, but as one of its distinctive factors. Hence, it will form 
an integral part of our individual scale of access to globalisation. 
A third and final aspect that needs to be mentioned regards the relationship between the 
local and the national level on one side, and the global level of interaction on the other. At first 
sight, one would expect that the rise in genuinely global relations is at the detriment of those at 
the lower level. In fact, several students see this effect taking place in the relationship between 
globalisation and the state. Many scholars argue that the state is progressively losing 
importance both in terms of political power and as a source of identification for individuals, as a 
direct consequence of globalisation. Although other scholars object that the power of the state is 
far from being wiped out by globalisation, and still holds on as one of the most effective sources 
of control over individuals and institutions, there is ground to put global and national relations in 
direct opposition to each other. Bauman (1998) argues that localisation and globalisation stand 
out against each other, too. In particular, localisation and globalisation are likely to mark a break 
in individual conditions that seems to bear the same connotation as the concept of ‘class’. In a 
world of people continuously ‘on the move’, he argues, being localised denotes lack of access, 
and thus it is a sign of social deprivation and degradation. This is particularly serious as 
localities are losing their meaning-generating and meaning-negotiating capacity and are 
increasingly dependent on interpretations they do not control. A similar view may be found in 
some empirical studies (see Albrow, 1997). 
However, other scholars see the dynamics between the local and the global level as 
more complex. Giddens (1990) argues that the decrease in some aspects of nationalist feeling 
linked to nation-states leads to the intensification of more localised nationalist sentiments. 
Robertson (1991) claims that the dynamic of globalisation involves a ‘search for fundamentals’, 
that is, a search for identity and expression both at the individual and at the societal level. 
Whereas this process was formerly seen by Robertson as implying a ‘declaration’ of identity of 
local societies (communities) as a reaction to globalisation, in his more recent works Robertson 
stresses that the expectation of identity declaration is built into the general process of 
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globalisation, and is thus a constitutive part of globalisation itself. Hence, as also stressed by 
others (Beck, 2000), far from being antithetical processes, globalisation and localisation may not 
only co-exist, but also they could be seen as essential to each other. 
2.2 The Public Goods Problem 
Public goods are characterized by two properties; first, they are non-rival in 
consumption, and second, they are non-excludable. The first property refers to the fact that the 
consumption of any individual in a group does not decrease the amount of the good available to 
other people. This may be due to the fact that the good is available in virtually unlimited supply – 
e.g. the oxygen present in the atmosphere – or because for its nature the good cannot be 
depleted – for instance, the formula to find the area of a triangle. In contrast, private goods are 
rival in consumption, in that someone’s consumption precludes consumption by someone else. 
Non-excludable goods are instead those for which the provision of the good makes it impossible 
to exclude some individual of a group from its consumption. For instance, all would benefit from 
the administration of a vaccine against a contagious disease; every citizen would gain from the 
provision of security measures to reduce crime rates.  
Clearly, goods may have different degrees of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Pure 
public goods are defined as those being at the same time non-rival and non-excludable to the 
maximum possible degree. However, some public goods may be not entirely non-rival in 
consumption, for instance were they available in large but not unlimited supply. In this case they 
may suffer of problems of congestion. For instance, the enjoyment of a park, or even the 
physical access to it, may be hindered were this to become overcrowded. Non-excludability is 
often dependent on the availability of technologies to exclude people and the associated costs 
in setting up such technology. For instance, access to public roads may be limited by the 
construction of toll gates, and access to an internet network may be subject to the knowledge of 
a password. Some public goods may be perfectly non-rival but still excludable, like for instance 
the chemical formula to produce Coca-Cola. Some others may be (virtually) non-excludable but 
rival in consumption, like fishing or hunting. Moreover, public goods may differ for the number of 
people who may have access to it, and their geographical location. So, the literature in 
international political economy has pointed at the importance of global public goods, in that their 
provision would extend to virtually every person on the planet. Typical examples are the 
environment, or the fight against diseases that may be spread across the planet. Some other 
public goods may have a more limited scale, like the construction of a road. In the present 
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research, we shall deal with pure public goods, which is made possible by the recourse to 
experimental social interactions. 
The above examples should have highlighted the problems associated with the provision 
of public goods. In fact, the structure of the incentives is such that individual and collective 
interests typically diverge in their provision. That is, although everyone would benefit from the 
access to a public good, the individual costs exceed the individual benefits in producing them. 
On the other hand, the social benefits – namely, the benefits for the group as a whole, which the 
utilitarian approach often treats as the ‘sum’ of individual benefits (see e.g. Broome, 1999) – 
exceed the overall costs for their provision. This is a typical problem of co-operation, or, as it is 
also called, a social dilemma. The provision of the public goods will require some form of joint 
action by the members of the group, which will go against their own self-interest but will 
increase the benefits for the group.  
The experimental studies of PGGs and of co-operation or selfishness in public goods 
provision is ubiquitous (see reviews of this literature in economics by Ledyard (1995), in 
psychology by Liebrand and Messick (1996) and in sociology by Kollock (1998)). The basic 
PGG involves a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) such that participants are endowed 
with a sum of money and are faced with the options of either keeping the money for themselves 
or allocating some or all of it to a public pot (a ‘kittie’), where total contributions are multiplied by 
the experimenter and then shared equally among the agents. With appropriate constraints, this 
situation represents a typical co-operation problem, in that contributing nothing is always the 
payoff-maximing strategy for an individual, but contributing everything allows everyone to reach 
a better outcome, which corresponds to the socially optimal one. The factor at which 
contributions to the kittie are multiplied is called the social return from one’s contribution, 
whereas the ratio between the social return and the number of agents is called the individual 
return from one’s contribution – or, as conventional in the literature, Marginal Per Capita Return 
(MPCR). In fact, the MPCR represents the fraction of one’s contribution to the public pot that will 
be returned to him/her. The general finding in the numerous experiments conducted on linear 
VCM PGGs is that the public good is provided at about 50% of its optimal level in one-shot 
interactions or in the first trial of repeated PGGs. That this result runs counter to economic 
rationality is mitigated by the observation that provision rates decrease as interaction goes on 
(Dawes and Thaler, 1988).  
Various strands of the social sciences literature have sought to provide an account of co-
operation in public goods problem situations. In this survey we shall focus in particular on two of 
these accounts. The first is a rational-choice based account, which is based on the notion of 
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reciprocity. The second account may be still construed in terms of suitably adapted model of 
rational choice, but this time the explanation does not rely solely on individual self-interest. That 
is, individuals must have some sort of social preferences involving other members of the group 
of people with which they interact (See Fehr and Schmidt, 2001, for a review). For instance, 
individuals may assign positive ‘utility’ to the ‘success’ of the group of which they are part6. 
Finally, other accounts are less consistent with rational choice models by emphasizing the 
aspect of obligation in complying with a certain social norm as an effect of group or societal 
influence. As a result, compliance takes place in the absence of a wilful choice by the agent. In 
the discussion below, I shall focus on the first two of these accounts, and I shall seek to 
envisage how globalisation may influence co-operation in societies. Finally, the implications of 
these considerations on individual experimental behaviour in our research will also be 
highlighted. 
2.3 Rational Choice Accounts of Co-operation 
An account of co-operation that has attracted wide attention and some degree of 
consensus across disciplines is that based on the notion of reciprocity. This may be seen most 
clearly when two individuals are involved in the same co-operation problem in several 
repetitions of the same interaction. The game-theoretic analysis of this type of ‘extended’ co-
operation problem has shown that co-operation may be the rational action even for purely self-
interested individuals. This is the case when the interaction does not have an end that is certain, 
and individuals have individual discount rates over the future that are sufficiently low, that is, 
individuals value future payoffs highly enough. In this case, a tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod, 1984), 
which prescribes to start co-operating, and then replicate the counterpart’s action in the last 
iteration of the game, may be shown to be a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium of the game.  
The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward. What tit-for-tat prescribes to do is 
to stop co-operating when the other individual stops doing so. Since joint co-operation is 
mutually beneficial, an individual who stops co-operating will anticipate the loss due to lack of 
the provision of the public good in the future. This may be called the threat of the counterpart 
retaliating over the individual’s lack of co-operation. Nevertheless, the fact that an individual is 
‘free-riding’ on the counterpart’s effort to provide the public good brings about a benefit in the 
current instance of the game. The result above may be restated by saying that, when individuals 
                                                 
6 In Ledyard (1995) a theory is put forward where the success of the group is identified with its members 
gaining a higher payoff than what they would have without being part of the group. Others models of 
individual behaviour accounting for co-operation in PGGs are altruism and reciprocal co-operation. 
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attach a sufficiently high value to future payoffs, then the threat of retaliation will exceed the 
short-term benefits from free-riding, thus establishing joint co-operation as the outcome of the 
interaction.  
Outside of the game-theoretic jargon, this result says that in two-party repeated 
interactions, the structure of incentives may be sufficient to make individual and collective 
interests coincide. The same argument may in principle be extended to situations where more 
than two individuals are involved. For instance, Kandori (1992) analyses the situation of 
pairwise co-operation problems where the couple of agents interacting are drawn at random 
from a large population of agents. In this setting, a version of tit-for-tat can be shown to 
engender a self-enforcing co-operative norm. However, this only happens under stringent 
conditions on the size of the population, on agents’ discount factor and on the frequency of the 
interactions. In fact, the generalization of the reciprocity argument to the case of a large 
population presents significant problems for its enforcement. First, as pointed out by Pettit 
(1989), the threat of retaliation associated with tit-for-tat may be rather ineffective in interactions 
involving large number of people. This is particularly true for ‘fouls dealing’ situations, i.e. those 
public goods problem where individual payoff varies discretely with the number of defectors in 
the population. In fact, the loss of surplus for the (N-m) co-operators in punishing the m 
defectors may be so large, when N is large and m small, to make the threat of retaliation non-
credible. In other words, in some conditions, tit-for-tat may not be a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. For instance, it really seems unlikely that the whole population of Londoners would 
start littering Hyde Park to punish the lone person dropping a hamburger bag.  
The problem of the enforcement has to do with the fact that the ‘punishment’ of the 
defector is in itself a public goods problem of a higher order for the group. In some instances, 
the nature of the interaction would lend itself to less drastic forms of punishment than tit-for-tat. 
For instance, it may be possible to think at institutional settings where policing makes it possible 
to identify defectors and induce some costs directly onto them. Bowles and Gintis (2004) 
explore the possibility of ostracism as a form of punishment directly addressing the defector, 
and introduce the notion of “strong reciprocity” to characterize the behaviour of individuals who 
not only co-operate in public goods problems, but also are available to sustain some personal 
costs to punish defectors. In the experimental literature, individual propensity to punish, at 
positive costs for the individual, has been tested in several studies. The nearly unanimous 
response has been that individuals have a high propensity to punish the transgressors of a co-
operative rule, even when this is costly to themselves (Oswald and Zizzo, 2000), and this leads 
to (near to) a fully co-operative equilibrium (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). 
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Other scholars argue that punishment may be less of a problem than what one may think 
at first. Once a norm is established, in fact, a natural disposition of resentment in not living up to 
the expectations of the other members of the group may be sufficient to bring about motivational 
incentives to comply with a co-operative rule. The idea that human beings have such a ‘natural’ 
disposition had been first put forward by Adam Smith in his “Theory of moral sentiments” (1759), 
and is now developed by proponents of the theory of ‘normative expectations’ (Pettit ,1990; 
Sugden, 2000) to explain compliance with social norms. In this theory, enforcement may thus 
happen at virtually no cost, as the presence of a convergent set of expectations on someone’s 
behaviour may suffice to guarantee his/her compliance. According to this theory, merely raising 
one’s eyebrow may suffice to guarantee the perpetuation of a social norm in a society. 
 
2.4 Globalisation and Social Identity 
2.4.1 The Notion of Community 
Globalisation students have explored different possible ways in which globalisation may 
affect social identities. In what follows, I shall try to summarise what I think are the most relevant 
for the present project. The notion from which to start is that of ‘community’ - or ‘ingroup’ in the 
language of social psychology. The basic characteristic of a community is the existence of some 
type of characteristics – ethnic, cultural, physical, spiritual, etc. – that provide individuals with 
some reasons to belong to a group of people sharing that characteristic. The property of 
‘belonging’ may be entirely objective and not elicit any particular feelings or emotions. For 
instance, I may be said to belong to the community of Italians resident abroad, even though I do 
not experience any particular ‘feelings’ of attachment towards it. It’s the fact of being born in 
Italy and having an Italian national citizenship that directly determines my belonging. 
Nevertheless, it has been widely demonstrated that most individuals associate to such a 
sense of belonging emotions and motivations to act that go well beyond a merely ‘objective’ 
sense of attachment. In fact, the most heroic and cruellest acts have been committed by 
individuals in the name of some community. Several studies have tried to give sense to these 
behaviours (see e.g. Hardin, 1995; Harrison, 2003). Social psychologists draw an analogy 
between the sense of personal identity that an individual experiences towards his or her self, 
and that of social identity that is experienced with respect to a group (Turner, 1982). For 
instance, what Sumner (1906) identified as the basic motivations of a member towards his or 
her ingroup, namely, the loyalty and the sense of privilege accorded to members with respect to 
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non-members, may be matched with self-integrity and self-esteem in the individual sphere. 
What is relevant for our analysis is that a community is generally associated with the 
interposition of a boundary between people ‘belonging to’ and ‘being outside of’ the group. Both 
the presence of an ingroup and an outgroup - the ‘us’ and the ‘others’ - have traditionally been 
deemed as necessary for the constitution of a community. The theoretical assumption we build 
on is that globalisation may affect this notion of social identity in several different ways.  
First, and most obviously given the above definition, it may bring to the fore some non-
territorial sense of identities. Secondly, regardless of the territorial character of the community, 
globalisation may redraw the previously existing boundaries between ingroups and outgroups. 
However, theories have been put forward that say that globalisation may act in either direction. 
In other words, according to the theorists close to the ‘cosmopolitan’ idea, more people may 
become included in the ‘we-group’ as an effect of globalisation. The enlargement of the ‘we-
group’ may however reduce the strength of the attachment to the ingroup, in the absence of 
those elements – symbolic, emotional, historical, mythical etc. - that provide the basis for 
individual belonging. A possible negative effect of globalisation on the strength of individual 
identification with local and national communities has also been put forward by Putnam (2000) 
in his comprehensive analysis of the historical evolution of social capital in the American 
society. His argument is that economic globalisation may trigger a decline in business leaders’ 
civic engagement, thus furthering the process of erosion of social capital already underway. 
Conversely, other theorists argue that globalisation may instead produce the opposite effect of 
excluding more people from the ingroup, or enhancing the sentiments of attachment to the 
ingroup and of distance towards the outgroup. Thirdly, according to the cosmopolitan idea, the  
we-group may become as large as encompassing the whole humankind. Although the extent to 
which the presence of an outgroup is really necessary in order to elicit sentiments of attachment 
to the ingroup may be questioned (see Brewer, 1996), this view seems to imply a major 
departure from the traditional ways of understanding social identity. Finally, most of the 
traditional views see a community as being predominant with respect to all others. An effect of 
globalisation may instead be to produce the loss of a ‘primary’ community as the basis for 
individual identity. Rather, several senses of identities may happen to be present in the 
individual characterisation of the self, which may lead to the view of social identities becoming 
‘hybridized’. Even in this case, this would bring non-obvious consequences on individual 
decision-making and the way the individual relates to others. In what follows I shall try to spell 
out these concepts more clearly, leaving to the next section their implications for individual 
decision-making in co-operation problems. 
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2.4.2 Globalisation and National Communities 
National identity has been traditionally identified as the main source of social identity for 
individuals. According to Scholte’s reconstruction (2000: 161-162), there are at least three basic 
elements concurring to form a national community: (a) the presence of a large population (this 
distinguishes a national community from a ‘traditional’ community); (b) attachment to a specific 
territorial homeland (which may not be physically inhabited in the case of a ‘diaspora’); (c) 
emphasis of cultural attributes that set it apart from other people. Language and what has been 
defined by Max Weber as the existence of shared beliefs on a common past and a common 
future, are often important elements of the culture defining a community. Note that state-nation 
is only one among the possible examples of nations, though arguably the most common form. 
In the vast literature on globalisation, one may find support for any of the possible 
positions as to the effect of globalisation on national identity. According to globalisation ‘true-
believers’, the most important effect of globalisation is precisely to weaken the sense of 
attachment to the nation-state. A second view is instead that of the sceptics of globalisation, that 
is, those who say that globalisation has only a marginal effect on people’s lives – or at least 
much smaller than what the globalisation supporters claim -, so that the state-nation holds on as 
the main sense of identity for individuals (see Smith, 1995: 5).  
An alternative view is instead based on the notion of the ‘ideology of resistance’ 
(Castells, 2004; Calhoun, 1994). According to this position, globalisation triggers a reaction 
against global flows of objects, commodities, people, ideas, which may lead to an entrenchment 
in the state-nation community. In terms of the model depicted above, this mechanism may be 
deemed as making the presence of an ‘other’ more vivid to members of a certain ingroup, thus 
strengthening even further the boundary between the ‘us’ and ‘them’7.  
Such a ‘backlash’ against globalisation may take place at different levels. First, it may 
strengthen the identity with the nation-state. This is the case when citizens find their shared 
interests threatened by globalisation, e.g. when trade is liberalized or restrictions to free 
movement of people are removed. This may also be the result of a direct action of national 
governments. In the words of Scholte (2000: 165), “State-nations old and new have often 
                                                 
7 Moreover, a functionalist account of nationalism in an age of globalisation is portrayed by Smith (1995: 4) 
along these lines: “In this unprecedented situation [that of the modern era], nations and nationalisms are necessary, if 
unpalatable, instruments for controlling the destructive effects of massive social changes; they provide the only large-scale and 
powerful communities and belief-systems that can secure a minimum of social cohesion, order and meaning in a disruptive and 
alienating world”. 
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actively reaffirmed their cultural distinctiveness in the face of intensified globalisation8”. But this 
effect is also evident at the level of non-state national communities, such as local communities, 
so-called ethno-nations (e.g. Basque, Scots, Quebecois), region-nations (e.g. the European 
Community, the League of Arab States, the organisation of African unity), and also communities 
that are not territorially contiguous, i.e. transworld-nations (e.g. the Chinese, Indians, Irish, 
Jews, scattered around the world). In some cases, a backlash against globalisation mechanism 
may be deemed to have been effective at this level, in particular for ethno-nations (see Mlinar, 
1992), but also for other communities (Halpering and Scheffer, 1992). Similarly to what argued 
for nation-states, local sentiments may be triggered by global flows directly threatening the 
interests – and sometimes the very existence - of local communities9. According to others (e.g. 
Hobswam, 1990) ethno-linguistic nationalism is instead nothing more than an irrational 
response to the rapidity of global changes, which are not destined to survive the tide of 
globalisation. Whether these sentiments of local attachment are temporary or permanent, it is 
worth noting that they generally go along with disaffection – or even open conflict – with the 
state-nation (Keating, 2001), which is but another example of the complexity of globalisation. 
Finally, the same backlash idea may be applied at the level of movements of people, sometimes 
with violent and tragic implications. According to Castells (2004), fundamentalist movements – 
ranging from Al-Qaeda to American Christian fundamentalists – may be seen as the most 
extreme forms that such an ‘ideology of resistance’ may take. 
2.4.3 Cosmopolitanism 
The theories reported in the foregoing section still construe social identity as being 
associated with a territory. However, given the characterization of globalisation as being the rise 
of supraterritoriality, it may be expected that different and non-territorially-based sense of 
identity be formed as an effect of globalisation. In fact, at the other extreme of the spectrum of 
possible social identities, lies the cosmopolitanism idea, i.e. that of a community so large as to 
comprehend the whole humankind, what in the world of Hannerz (1992) may be called a ‘global 
ecumene’. Were this view correct, then, clearly there would be no ‘others’ to refer to in order to 
define the ‘us’ (at least in the foreseeable future). The flourishing of several ‘global’ social 
movements around a variety of causes such as human rights or the environment, and the 
growing importance of global humanitarian relief operations are all instances of this 
                                                 
8 Examples of this are the measures taken by several governments to counter the encroachments of global 
English, and the surge of xenophobic parties all around the world (see Scholte, 2000: 164). 
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cosmopolitan conscience (Held, 1995; Chea and Robbins, 1998; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). 
The importance of the notion of the growing awareness of the world as a whole as already been 
emphasised (see section 2.1). Secondly, other critics argue that people living in different parts 
of the world may converge to a similar form of identity by means of a process of homogenisation 
of culture, production, and values, as a consequence of the spread of capitalism and of the 
western way of life/culture (for a discussion see Tomlison, 2003; Shepard and Hayduk, 2002). 
However, other critics point at the difficulties implicit in this idea, first and foremost the 
lack of a ‘global culture’ to which a world community may hinge upon (Smith, 1990). Moreover, 
the World Values Survey shows that the cosmopolitan idea is still a rather tepid one as a source 
of identity, though it shows some sign of increase over generations, (Norris, 2000). 
2.4.4 Supra-national Communities and Hybridisation 
Finally, there is a third view on social identity in relation to globalisation. This hinges on 
the idea that globalisation makes it possible to develop supra-national communities, which are 
deterritorialised in character; examples are various types of religious, racial, class, youth, 
gender, lesbian/gay, and class solidarities (Scholte, 2000). If taken singularly, these solidarities 
do not seem to alter the traditional way of construing a community in terms of “us” and “others” 
(Scholte, 2000), although they do no longer have a territorial linkage. We may then conjecture 
that this may lead to individuals having a ‘set’ of different identities, which are used in different 
social situations depending on the ‘community’ with which they are interacting (see also Arnett, 
2002). Obviously, some of these identities may be territorially-linked, whereas some other may 
not be so. However, the overlapping of different social identities may even have a more radical 
effect, in that the individual’s sense of identity may become a “hybrid”, with several solidarities 
blended together and the self becoming fluid and fragmented (Scholte, 2000; Tomlison, 2003; 
Hannerz, 1992). This gives rise to a different model of social identity than the communitarian, as 
no neat group distinction and oppositions appear, thus making it more difficult for an individual 
to form reliable social bonds and foster social cohesion with a group (Scholte, 2000). Obviously, 
this may have a relevant impact on both the relative allocation of co-operation in our 
experiments, but also in its overall size. 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 See for instance the indigenous movement spurred by the deforestation in Amazonia; or the 1994 Nafta agreement 
that, according to some critics, has elicited the Zapatista rebellion; see Scholte, 2000: 168 
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2.5 Other Aspects 
2.5.1 Globalisation and Culture 
This distinction of three types of identities also carries over to the relationship between 
globalisation and culture. So, at one extreme we have the view that national culture survives 
because of (a) insignificant effect of globalisation; (b) a pro-nation-state effect; (c) an anti-
nation-state – and pro-ethnic-minority - effect. At the opposite extreme we have the 
homogenisation thesis, according to which with globalisation the world is converging to a same 
set of common values. The latter view may either take a negative turn when emphasising the 
‘extinction’ of local cultures, especially as an effect of a westernisation of the world and spread 
of capitalism, or take a more positive one when pointing to ‘enlightened’ notions such as the 
defence of human rights, etc. In between the two lies the notion of multi-culturalism and 
hybridisation of culture.  
Culture may be a mediating mechanism of globalisation in our study, in that a shift in a 
society’s culture may lead to a change in individual decision-making leaving the individual’s 
social identity unaltered. Questions from the World Value Survey (WVS henceforth) are used in 
our questionnaire to take into account this aspect. However, culture seems a concept with a 
higher dimensionality than, for instance, social identity, so that it may be difficult to arrive to a 
measure of such a concept within a questionnaire. 
2.5.2 Trust 
Although our research takes co-operation as its main explanandum, it is almost 
inevitable that the concept of trust enters the picture as well. One of the most credited accounts 
of co-operative behaviour in PGGs is that individuals are conditional cooperators (Croson, 1999, 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 2003), that is, people cooperate only insofar as they expect (a 
sufficiently high number of) other people to co-operate, too. Hence, trusting others to co-operate 
is a pre-condition for actual co-operative behaviour.  Therefore, we believe it necessary to 
measure participants’ levels of trust in the other people with whom they are matched in the 
various PGGs. 
Our measurement of trust is suggested by the work of Orbell, Dawes and Schwartz-
Shea (1994) who argued that trust is the expectation of another’s behaviour in a situation 
involving vulnerability.  This definition concurs with a broad body of research conceptualizing 
trust as an expectation (e.g. Deutsch 1958; Rotter 1967; Williamson 1993). Although the degree 
of vulnerability one experiences in a PGG setting may be less than, say, the degree of 
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vulnerability in a trust game (in which the trustee typically acts as a dictator in returning the 
sender’s investment), vulnerability is still present. 
2.6 Globalisation and Co-operation 
In section 2.3, I reported on theories of co-operation based on the idea of reciprocity. On 
the basis of the survey, one may expect that the impact of globalisation on co-operation may be 
relevant and negative. This is true for a variety of reasons. First, globalisation is likely to make 
the enforcement of social norms more difficult. Even assuming that such enforcement costs 
were manageable, what all of those accounts reviewed before have in common is to require 
personal forms of interaction between the defector and the punisher to bring about the 
compliance with the norm. As Sobel (2002) puts it, dense social networks “facilitate good 
behaviour by publicizing past actions and making it possible to punish non-co-operative 
actions”. North (1990) also emphasises how norms of co-operation are mostly likely to arise in 
close-knit communities, because monitoring costs and the possibility of transmitting the 
information across people are lower than in less cohesive societies whose relations are more 
impersonal and less frequent. Since one of the effects of globalisation is to break such social 
networks, and transform personal, small-scale and frequent interactions characteristic of close-
knit ‘traditional’ communities into anonymous, large-scale and rare social exchanges, this 
makes the enforcement of social norms more difficult, and thus endangers the associated co-
operative outcomes. 
Whereas the above argument obviously holds in particular to the local level of 
interactions, it is clearly less applicable to higher levels of interaction, given the increased 
difficulty of having personal and frequent types of relationship in these contexts. It is apparent 
that norms enforcement relies in this case to formal instruments of control and institutionalized 
agencies, such as a legal system and a policing service. However, there exists a second 
theoretical argument that implies a negative effect of globalisation even in these settings. By 
broadening the number of people involved in an interaction, and by making the nature of 
interactions more complex than before, enforcement costs are likely to increase even in co-
operation problems at levels above the local. This is mainly due to the heightened informational 
problems in detecting ‘deviant’ agents, and to the possibility that the ‘defectors’ fall out of the 
jurisdictional boundaries to which legal and security systems may be applied. For instance, 
national governments are faced with increased problems in implementing anti-pollution laws, if 
the felonies happen outside their national boundaries. Agreements between trade unions and 
entrepreneurs to keep inflation under control and maintain social peace may be endangered by 
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increased competition from other people living in other countries. Moreover, the absence of 
effective systems of sanctions at the international level begets a lack of formal systems of 
punishment, thus making the reciprocity argument even more problematic (Edwards and Zadek 
2003). Hence, both co-operation at the national and the global level may be endangered by 
globalisation. 
The only way in which globalisation may be deemed as bringing about a positive impact 
on co-operation, in particular for what concerns the national and global level, is by making 
interactions more frequent than before. In fact, I have already stressed how the reciprocity 
account relies on relatively frequent interactions in order to make the temporal horizon of the 
interaction equivalent to the mathematical notion of an infinitely-long one. Therefore, inasmuch 
as globalisation makes interacting easier, it may also engender a positive impact at the level 
where this is the case. 
A second theoretical hypothesis over the influence of globalisation on individual 
decision-making is that this is mediated by a changed consciousness of an individual’s own 
identity through the increased engagement with one another. Thus, the traditional conception of 
‘us’ and the ‘others’ is either likely to be entirely restructured, or to be transformed so that 
various conceptions coexist alongside each other and are used in different social situations 
(Arnett, 2002). This basic contrast in how globalisation influences individual identity suggests 
differing explanations for individuals’ behaviour in co-operative problems in different contexts. 
One would obviously expect that the higher the identification with a group, the higher the 
propensity to co-operate at that corresponding level. However, in the previous sections I have 
emphasised how theories differ in what the influence of globalisation is going to be in terms of 
identification at the local, national, and global level. On the one hand, the cosmopolitan idea 
implies an expansion of the ingroup boundaries, so that an individual is likely to include people 
at a wider order than the local or the national into her own relevant community. Putnam (2000) 
discusses the link between economic globalisation and individual engagement with the local 
community emphasising the negative relationship between the two aspects. On the other hand, 
an even more radical entrenchment to ‘local’ concepts of identity may be triggered as a direct 
reaction to the process of homogenization that is often associated with globalisation (Castells, 
2004). In addition to the argument illustrated above, social identity theory from psychology 
suggests that identification with a group typically rests on the perceived existence of a ‘stranger’ 
to the group, that is, individuals or groups who have different social/cultural/economic 
characterizations than those of the group to which one belongs (Messick and Brewer, 1983). 
  22 
The process of globalisation may indeed make the perception of the ‘stranger’ more vivid and 
definite than before, thus leading to higher levels of in-group (or localized) co-operation.  
Consequently, different predictions may be derived from these theories. As for the local 
level, the cosmopolitan argument implies that co-operation is likely to be either unaffected or 
reduced, were the strength of the attachment decrease as an effect of the expansion of the 
ingroup. The social capital argument, at least in Putnam’s view, leads to a definite negative 
relationship. The resistance argument would instead lead to the prediction of a likely increase in 
local co-operation. As for co-operation at the national level, it has already been emphasised 
how globalisation studies see the relationship between the national and the global level as if the 
two levels could be pitted in direct contrast to each other. Hence, one may expect that higher 
globalisation would lead to smaller identification at the state-nation level, and thus decrease the 
individual propensity to co-operate at that level. However, I have stressed how a resistance 
argument may be applied at the state-nation level, too, so that this prediction may be reversed. 
Finally, the cosmopolitan argument is obviously most likely to predict an increased propensity to 
co-operate when applied to the global context. This may make people more concerned with the 
fate of other people, thus fostering co-operation in the global domain. However, this prediction 
may be reversed by considering that increased globalisation may actually raise the diffidence of 
individuals towards foreigners in many countries (Barth, 1995), as well as hinder rather than 
facilitate the achievement of a common system of shared beliefs on mutual behaviour 
(Nadelmann 1990; also see Ostrom 2003, for a discussion of the influence of shared norms on 
co-operation). Hence, even in this case existing theories do not agree on what impact 
globalisation will have on co-operation.  
Several caveats apply to the above theoretical considerations. Firstly, what will be 
recreated in the laboratory is obviously a situation of interaction very different from what an 
individual may face in real life. Some individuals entering our research may have not 
consciously faced a situation of interaction at the global level in all of their life! Moreover, the 
participants of our research will be involved in one-shot interactions, whereas this is on the one 
hand inconsistent with the reciprocity argument highlighted above, and on the other hand this is 
to some extent inopportune in experimental settings10. In particular, one of the consequences of 
the one-shot nature of the interaction could be that individuals will frame the global co-operation 
                                                 
10 One of the reasons why participants in experiments are very often involved in repeated interactions, is that 
in this way they are given the possibility of familiarizing with the interaction. This also enables the 
experimenter to study ‘learning effects’.    
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problem as one of whether to offer a donation to poorest countries or not11. Even with all of 
these limitations, and with due caution, I believe that it is appropriate to draw on these 
theoretical ideas to construe experimental individual behaviour. In particular, one may argue 
that people do apply a reciprocity type of heuristic in one-shot interactions, too. 
 
 
3 Research Design 
 In this section the proposed research design of the GCT project is discussed. 
Specifically the following elements are presented; first, the experimental design involving a 
series of linear and nested PGGs, second, the questionnaire design, next, the selection of 
countries involved and the sampling procedures used within each country, fourth, the 
implementation of the design, and finally the controls that will be employed in the multi-country 
research to provide the greatest amount of confidence that our procedures and results are not 
culturally biased.   
3.1 Experimental Design of the Public Goods Games 
Participants in our research are faced with a series of three PGGs.  Each game is 
independent from the other two games, and participants are matched with a different, randomly 
chosen group for each game.  In each game participants are given 10 tokens which they may 
allocate as they choose. First, the standard version of linear PGG is employed in our 
experimental design as a baseline condition, as it captures the basic propensity to co-operate in 
the local environment. For the second and third games, we need a variant of the standard PGG 
in order to more clearly address the specific questions of our research. In particular, three 
factors need to be considered. First, we desire a game which would have external validity in 
terms of its representation of various levels of public goods, from the smaller local public good, 
to the larger global public good. Second, we want a design which would clearly highlight the 
tension an individual faces between keeping money for him/herself, contributing to the local 
public good, and contributing to the national or global public good. Third, we need a game which 
would be easily understood by the average person in both developed and developing countries. 
                                                 
11 This is one of the reasons why the core research group decided to change the experimental instructions. 
The current version label participants in the global co-operation problem as ‘people coming from different 
parts of the world’, whereas the previous version listed the countries actually sampled in the research. In that 
way, we are better able to grasp what the plain idea of ‘the world’ conveys to individuals.  
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 To that end, we construct an experimental design using a nested PGG similar to that 
employed by Blackwell and McKee (2003) in economics and by Witt and Kerr (2002) in 
psychology. In a nested PGG, individuals have the option of keeping their endowment for 
themselves (I), contributing some of it to a local pot (L), and/or contributing some of it to a larger 
pot – in this case representing either a national (N) or global pot (G).  Participants play two 
interactions involving this nested PGG, one in which the contribution entails a choice between 
the local and national pot (Decision 2), and a second in which the contribution entails a choice 
between the local and global pots (Decision 3). The local pot is comprised of the participant plus 
three other participants from the local area.  The national or global pot consists of the 
participant’s local group plus two other groups of four people, either from different areas of the 
same country, or from two different countries.  Such nested PGGs allow us to study the impact 
of ‘enlarging’ the boundaries of an individual’s social environment on his/her propensity towards 
co-operation.  The design is seen schematically below: 
 
 
Figure 1 
Importantly, this design fulfils our first two criteria in that it does realistically map onto the 
nature of local-global relations.  In the global economy, globalisation does not exclude the local 
constituency but potentially expands the level of inclusion to both local and non-local 
participants.  Secondly, our design also captures the tension between the different incentives 
from giving to the local vis-à-vis the global or national public goods. In our design, individual 
return – i.e. the MPCR – from giving to the local public pot is greater than that of the national or 
global pot; but on the other hand, the social return is higher in the latter.  In this fashion, we are 
able to examine under what conditions individuals put global (or national) interests ahead of 
local ones when everyone might be able to benefit in the long run.    
Preliminary tests of different versions of the games on college students in the US, 
Canada, and Spain in early fall 2004, demonstrated that a return ratio of 2:1 between the two 
pots – that is an MPCR of .50 for the local pot and of .25 for the global pot, for example - was 
I
N  /  G 
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the most quickly grasped and easily understood, thus fulfilling our third criteria.  (Prior research 
regarding the appropriate MPCR to implement yields ambiguous and conflicting conclusions, 
and thus could not serve as a guide12). In summary, our experimental design involves a total of 
three decisions for each participant, which are summarised in Figure 2, along with the variable 
definitions that will be used thereafter in the paper. 
Decision 1 is a standard linear PGG with voluntary contribution mechanisms, where 
people interact with three other people coming from their own locality at a MPCR of 0.5. The 
marginal social return for a contribution to the local public pot, which measures the total return 
to the group of an individual’s contribution to the public pot is then equal to 2. In fact, this is 
simply the product of MPCR by the number of people who are part of the group. Decisions 2 
and 3 instead consist of nested PGGs, in that subjects will have two different public pots to 
which they can allocate their endowment. One is a local public pot, where again four people 
coming from the same local community can contribute. The second public pot includes the 
same subjects as the local one plus other two groups of four people coming from the same 
country (Decision 2) or from different parts of the world (Decision 3). The relative social returns 
are labelled MNSR and MWSR, respectively for the national and the global public pot. Because 
the participant is making these three decisions, between-game comparisons provide a form of 
control (rendering the actual choice of per capita and social returns and group size less of a 
concern). In fact, Decision 2 and 3 have the same parameter structure in terms of marginal per 
capita and social returns at the local and higher order level. Thus any differences between 
contributions in Decision 2 and Decision 3 can be attributed to the differences in the identity of 
the people – national rather than global - rather than to group size or payoff structure.  
Our measure of trust is captured in the single question: “I expect the other 3 (11) 
members of my group to allocate to the local (or national or global) pot on average?”  This 
question is asked of participants regarding each of their decisions in all four games. 
 
Decisio
n 
Type of game Type of 
interaction 
Options available  Variable
s name 
Parameters 
of the game
1 PGG at the Non-Nested - Personal account  P1  
                                                 
12 The conclusions of both Ledyard (1995) and Kollock (1998) are that the relationship between MPCR and 
N is not yet fully understood. As for studies that have dealt with a nested structure, Wit and Kerr (2002) 
focused on the issue of categorization and framing in their study and never discussed the baseline effects of 
manipulating MPCR or N. Blackwell and McKee (2003) did manipulate the MPCRs of the global vis-à-vis the 
‘group’ pots in order to study its impact on contributions to the public goods, but did not discuss the role of 
N.   
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Figure 2 
It should be noted that virtually all of our understanding of co-operation in the PGG is 
based upon the play of undergraduate university students. Furthermore, PGG research has 
focused on provision to pots in a local context.  Our research, involving common people in each 
country participating in PGGs in local, national, and global contexts, departs from these norms. 
Participants to the research will be randomly selected through quota sampling techniques 
among the general public. In doing so it will extend the PGG literature, and increase 
understanding of the the extent to which this research is generalizable to different populations 
and contexts. 
  27 
3.2 Questionnaire Construction  
Our dependent variables are obtained in the PGGs just described and are an individual’s 
allocation behaviour in a public goods setting involving local, national and global public goods. A 
number of (potential) independent variables for our analysis come from an individual level 
questionnaire at the end of the experiment. The whole questionnaire is not included in this 
paper, but a small extract of its questions and the account of how the indexes have been 
constricted are reported at the end of this paper. The items that formed the indexes of 
globalisation used in the analysis shown below are available from the author upon request. 
The first and most important aspect that the questionnaire is designed to measure is 
individual exposure and participation in global relations. Although aggregate measures of 
globalisation exist, the number and the complexity of other factors that would play into the 
relationship between the ‘macro’ and the ‘meso’ level13 on one side, and the micro-level on the 
other, is likely to make these measures poor predictors of individual experimental behaviour14. 
Therefore, the research group concluded that it was preferable to rely solely on individual level 
information, and to measure these from a questionnaire. Macro and meso level measures would 
instead be used for the selection of the environments, in order to maximize the variance in 
individual access to globalisation. Moreover, it was also argued that it would be the case to 
conduct the research within a relatively limited territory, in order to remove possible 
determinants of individual behaviour that were unrelated with globalisation. Such sources of 
disturbances would have instead occurred had the research been conducted in different regions 
within a country with significantly different culture, history, political situations, etc.  
That developed for the present research is – to the best of our knowledge - the first 
example of an individual level (objective) scale of globalisation. In analogy with both the CSGR 
(2005) and the Foreign Policy (2005) indexes of country-level globalisation, the questionnaire 
                                                 
13 For instance, the CSGR and the AT Kearney – Foreign Policy globalisation indexes offer measures of 
globalisation at the country-level. Indices of exposure and participation in globalisation at a lower level may 
be obtained by considering the type of urban setting where a subject lives, with individuals living in larger 
urban settings being arguably more exposed and more able to access global relations than other people. 
Similarly, the degree of ethnic etetogeneity is also a determinant of the individual exposure to global relations.  
14 In the original setting of the research, it had been planned to recruit people from two radically different 
urban environments in each country. These would be a large urban area noted for its degree of 
interconnectedness with the rest of the world, both in terms of business activities and in migration or tourist 
flows, and a smaller city or town with a significantly lesser degree of interconnectedness. This would then be 
used as a ‘meso’-level measure of exposure/participation into globalisation. However, although the presence 
of urban size effects was (midly) significant in the analysis conducted to test this research setting, the research 
group opted for excluding this variable from the analysis. In fact, the difficulties associated with having a 
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aims to capture individual access to globalisation under the social, cultural, political, and 
economic dimension. In particular, questions referring to social globalisation ask participants 
whether they possess/have access to tools of interpersonal communication, like telephones, 
internet, TVs, etc., and, if so, whether they use them to get in contact with other people at the 
local, national, or global level. Cultural globalisation is measured both by an individual’s access 
to international sources of information, arts, etc., and by her degree of consciousness with 
typical global issues, such as global warming, spread of public diseases, etc. Political 
globalisation is measured by a subject’s attitudes towards political international institutions, such 
as the United Nations, multilateral treaties15, etc. Economic globalisation is instead measured by 
the subject’s consumption habits in terms of purchasing from national rather than foreign or 
multinational producers. Such questions ask the frequency and the extent to which an individual 
is connected with other people, either directly (e.g. through means of communication) or 
indirectly (e.g. through purchasing products produced abroad and/or by multinationals, or 
through accessing international sources of information). Questions also tried to capture the 
territorial scale of such relationships, with relations at the international (global) level obviously 
counting more than interactions at the national or local level. Responses to these questions 
were aggregated into indexes under the four dimensions indicated above. 
Other sets of questions are designed to capture different aspects that may directly 
influence individual behaviour, or mediate the influence of globalisation on it. First, some 
questions measure individual moral values. These are taken from the World Value Survey, and, 
according to Inglehart (2003), are the best predictors of what the author calls the self-expression 
Vs traditional dimension of culture. Second, another section asks standard questions referring to 
the degree of trust the subjects have towards other people living in her community. Third, a set 
of social identity measures aims to capture a possible relevant mediating mechanism between 
globalisation and individual behaviour. These are taken from two existing measures of social 
identity. One - from Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, and Takemura, (2004) YMBT henceforth - focuses 
on identity at the local, national and global levels. The other measure, from WVS, pits various 
communities against each other by asking to which of them an individual feels the greatest and 
the least sense of belonging. Fourth, some questions taken from the WVS are meant to 
                                                                                                                                                             
homogenous cross-country measure of urban settlment size seemed too big to make of this variable a reliabe 
predictor. 
15 Admittedly, the index in this case measures attitudes towards political issues, rather than the actual 
participation in political activities on the global scale. However, we thought it was important to have a 
measure of the individual’s involvement with such issues. Other questions within the questionnaire, which 
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measure the presence of possible sentiments of aversion towards foreign culture/people. Other 
questions from the PEW Global Attitudes Survey (2002) are designed to control for the 
correspondence between individual behaviour and the type of attitudes manifested in the other 
section of the questionnaire. Finally, standard demographic measures control for factors such 
as age, gender, level of income, ethnicity, education, and employment, etc. 
3.3 Selection of Research Environments, Sampling Techniques, and Implementation 
 Research environments are selected for this project with the goal of representing a 
sufficient degree of variability on the globalisation spectrum as ranked by the aggregate CSGR 
globalisation index. Six countries have been chosen, with the aim of both maximizing the 
dispersion of each dimension of the CSGR globalisation indexes – namely, the economic, 
social, and political dimension – and of ensuring a sufficient geographic dispersion, so that each 
continent were represented. The choice fell on Italy and Argentina (respectively, at the highest 
and lowest positions in the economic globalisation sub-index); US and South Africa (at the 
extremes of the social globalisation index); Russia and Iran (at the extremes of the political 
globalisation index). This also ensures a sufficient level of dispersion with respect to the overall 
globalisation scale. 
Second, we select several environments in each country which reflect differing levels of 
globalisation as indicated by a series of criteria, such as the relative presence of multi-national 
corporations (MNCs), and by the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the population (which may 
reflect the presence of immigrant populations). Clearly, data on these variables will not be 
accurate or available in all countries.  In these instances, relying on the expertise of the local 
researcher, the environments will be selected to represent relatively “very globalised” and “less 
or little globalised” example within a given country.  For example, within the US, two research 
environments that were chosen for a pilot study carried out in November 2004 were: 
 
 
 
 Portage, WI Houston, TX 
Population 9,728 1,857,540
Demographics 98+%  White 35%  White;  32% Hispanic;  28% Black;  6% 
Asian
                                                                                                                                                             
have not been analysed yet, ask more specifically about a subject’s active involvement with political 
organizations. 
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MNCs none 340 European cos; 110 Japanese cos.; 
3400 local business with intl. activities 
 
Third, 200 participants are recruited in each country (with extra participants recruited to 
allow for non-respondents) according to a quota sampling method. The criteria which determine 
the sample are age (three categories: 19-30, 31-50, 51-70), gender (two categories: male, 
female), and social economic status (SES) (three categories: high, intermediate, and low). This 
determines a grid with 18 cells to be filled with equal numbers of participants in each cell, to the 
maximum extent possible. The manner of ascertaining the SES of participants will be left to the 
local researcher to determine which method or question is most culturally appropriate. Most 
often this question will regard education or type of employment (serving as proxies for low or 
high SES), and income, though we may expect subjects would be reluctant to reveal their 
income in a non-anonymous interview. Although suggestions for the manner of recruiting are 
provided to collaborators, the exact method employed will again be left up to the local 
researcher to determine the most culturally appropriate method. Sampling will happen in two 
stages: in the first contact, the position of a subject who is available to participate in the 
research is ascertained with respect to the three criteria above. Should the ‘cell’ in the grid 
occupied by the subject be filled already, then the subject is turned down. The administration of 
the experiment is oral, in order to allow as large as possible an inclusion of possible 
participants. This allows us to sample illiterate people, who are arguably at the lowest end in the 
participation to globalisation. 
An experimental protocol, which explains how to conduct the various phases of the 
research, will be distributed to all local researchers. Moreover, experiment control is also 
guaranteed by the presence of a member of the core research team in each location. The 
experiment session will follow these phases. First, participants complete the series of three 
PGGs.  The experiment sessions are to be conducted in groups of no less than four and no 
more than sixteen participants.  Participants are told that they are involved in a series of 
decisions involving people from their own local area, some of whom may or may not be in the 
same room, from a different location in their own country, and from other countries around the 
world.  The name of the other national environment is not revealed in order to avoid any 
stereotyping or bias in attitudes or behaviour which may occur in reaction to being paired with 
people from that environment (for example, a participant may have a preconceived notion about 
how someone from a small Midwestern town will behave). Likewise, participants are told that in 
the global PGGs they will be matched with people from other parts of the world. Even in this 
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case, the specific name of the countries chosen for the matching is not revealed in order to 
avoid any bias in attitudes which may occur. Next, the allocation data are computed on the 
same location, using an algorithm provided beforehand.  
3.4 Experiment Controls 
 The international character of this research warrants that we control for country or 
culture-specific variables that could influence results. Specifically, we address the following as 
suggested by Roth et al. (1991), and modified by Buchan and Croson (1999) and Buchan, 
Croson and Dawes (2002). 
1. Controlling for subject pool equivalency.  To insure as similar a subject pool as possible, we 
are taking two measures.  First, we use a method of quota sampling in each country as opposed 
to representative sampling.  While a representative sample may be more externally valid, it 
would produce samples which are highly skewed in terms of age, gender or SES, depending on 
the location. Second, as discussed, we include a number of demographic questions on the 
questionnaire; answers to these questions will be entered as covariates in the final analysis of 
results. 
2. Controlling for understanding.  While in all experiments it is paramount that participants 
understand the experimental task, checking for participant understanding is absolutely crucial 
when subject pools of common people with varying levels of education are used.  Therefore, 
built into the experiment instructions there is a basic understanding check, in which subjects are 
asked to answer some questions about the interaction. Obviously, subjects are repeatedly 
invited to ask questions to the experimenter should they be unclear with aspect of the 
interaction. If a subject fails to pass the comprehension check, his data will be expunged from 
the analysis. 
3. Controlling for currency effects.  We control for purchasing power parity by choosing 
denominations such that monetary incentives relative to subject income and living standards 
were approximately equal across countries (as in Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992).  These 
amounts are based on the most recent Big Mac index, when available, or on the most recent 
Workd Bank data for PPP factors. Recommendations of experts on each economy are also 
taken into account.  
4. Controlling for Language Effects.  To control for any nuances in language which may impact 
results across countries, instructions and questionnaire for each the experiments will be 
translated into the native language and back-translated into English using separate external 
translators. 
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4.  Controlling for Experimenter Effects. To insure that the experiment is carried out in an 
identical manner in each country we first designed a detailed protocol to be followed by each 
experimenter.  Second, the lead researchers conducted pilot testing of the experiment in various 
occasions among students at the University of Warwick and Carleton University, allowing each 
to see and carry out the experiment.  Third, collaborating researchers who were not present at 
that pilot testing will be trained in the experimental procedures by one of the lead members of 
the team, and will (along with their local assistants) conduct a pilot test of the experiment with 
the core member watching and advising as to any irregularities. 
 
4 Pre l iminary Resul ts  f rom a  Pi lot  Study 
4.1 Analysis of Experimental Behaviour 
In the present section I discuss results coming from a pilot experiment in the US and 
Spain.  This was conducted in October 2005 by three members of the core research team 
(Brewer in Columbus, Ohio, US; Wilson in Houston, Texas, US; Fatas in Valencia, Spain). The 
main purpose of the pilot experiment was to check whether order effects exist with respect to 
the questionnaire being administered before or after the experiment. Preliminary analysis 
confirms that such effects may exist. However, both the quantity and the relevance of such 
effects do not seem to require any major change in the design. The presence of such effects will 
have to be taken into account when interpreting the results from data analysis. The other aim of 
this pilot study was to check that procedures worked smoothly, and that the oral administration 
of the questionnaire did not create problems of comprehension to the subjects. The researchers 
who conducted the pilot all agreed this was the case. On average across countries, the 
experiment and the questionnaire lasted approximately 75 minutes, to which another quarter of 
an hour for paperwork and payment of the subjects have to be added. 
In a pilot experiment conducted in November 2004, participants were recruited from the 
general public using the quota sampling method described earlier. Although time-consuming, 
we were thus able to check that this process of recruitment is feasible. In the present pilot, 
therefore, we recruited subjects from a population of university students. However, the presence 
of some retired students in the Spanish sample enables us to test the presence of possible age 
effects.  
There was no show-up fee for participants in the US sample, whereas retired Spanish 
students were paid a show up fee of 7 Euros. The token value was half a dollar and half a Euro 
in the US and Spain, respectively, which ensure PPP-equivalency between the two currencies. 
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In total there were 98 observations; 39 from Ohio, 19 from Houston, and 40 from Valencia (of 
which 20 from the population of retired students). Average contributions and standard deviations 
(in parentheses) are reported in Table 1. 
 
Average Contribution to Public Goods per Environment 
 
 L 1 
 
L2 N2 L2+N2 L3 W3 L3+W3 
Total 6.07 
(2.99) 
2.33 
(2.01) 
4.76 
(3.09) 
7.12 
(2.99) 
1.94 
(1.73) 
4.64 
(3.26) 
6.58 
(3.21) 
    
Spain 
Total 
5.2 
(2.74) 
1.98 
(1.48) 
4.22 
(2.90) 
6.20 
(3.13) 
1.90 
(1.44) 
3.68 
(2.90) 
5.58 
(3.40) 
Spain 
Students 
4.61 
(3.17) 
1.70 
(1.64) 
4.35 
(3.41) 
6.04 
(3.91) 
1.30 
(1.29) 
3.39 
(3.29) 
4.70 
(3.81) 
Spain 
Retired 
6.06 
(1.78) 
2.35 
(1.17) 
4.06 
(2.11) 
6.41 
(1.66) 
2.71 
(1.26) 
4.06 
(2.33) 
6.76 
(2.39) 
        
US Total 6.66 
(3.04) 
2.57 
(2.29) 
5.19 
(3.19) 
7.76 
(2.73) 
1.97 
(1.92) 
5.31 
(3.35) 
7.28 
(2.89) 
US Ohio 6.69 
(2.86) 
2.85 
(1.83) 
4.72 
(2.63) 
7.56 
(2.46) 
2.28 
(1.86) 
5.00 
(2.99) 
7.28 
(2.60) 
US 
Houston 
6.58 
(3.47) 
2.00 
(3.02) 
6.16 
(4.02) 
8.16 
(3.25) 
1.32 
(1.92) 
5.95 
(4.01) 
7.26 
(3.51) 
Table 1 
 
As shown in Figure 3, co-operation rates are always higher in the US than in Spain, especially 
with respect to the Spanish student population. Note that in decision 2 and 3 the co-operation 
rate is given by the sum of the allocations towards the two pots available in those decisions. An 
inverse-U relationship seems to emerge across the three decisions. Mann-Whitney tests on the 
difference of mean contributions to common pot(s) in US and Spain confirm that the difference 
is always significant for L1 (z =  -2.249;Prob > |z| = 0.0245); (L2+N2) (z =-2.867;Prob > |z| 
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=0.0041); and (L3+W3) (z = -2.533; Prob > |z| =0.0113). Moreover, a country dummy is 
significant in most of the econometric analysis that has been conducted.  
Co-operation rates
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
L1 L2+N2 W3+L3
Pots
Ohio Houston Valencia students Valencia retired  
Figure 3 
Not only are mean contributions different across countries, but significant differences 
emerge across decisions, too. Paired t-tests conducted on the difference of means in co-
operation rates across the three decisions, confirm that they are significantly different from each 
other. Hence, individual propensity to co-operate appears to be sensitive to both the structure of 
the interaction – nested versus non-nested – and to the nationality of the people with whom an 
individual is interacting. In particular, overall co-operation decreases on average when 
individuals are interacting with foreigners and local people in a nested public goods interaction 
(Decision 3) than when they interacting with other fellow citizens (Decision 2). Figure 1 also 
shows that this is true for all groups of people apart from the retired population in Valencia, 
which points to the possible presence of age effects in how these ‘framing’ effects work. 
The fact that co-operation rates are higher in both decisions 2 and 3 vis-à-vis decision 1 
may be explained by the fact that individual co-operation propensity is influenced not only by the 
composition of the group but also by the number of groups participating in the interaction, 
especially when the difference is made salient to individuals, as is the case in our setting. For 
instance, one may conjecture that individuals whose co-operation is motivated by altruism would 
be willing to benefit both groups present in the interaction. Or, were the motivation of co-
operation mainly of a conditional type, it may be supposed that individuals would be willing to 
differentiate their ‘portfolio’ allocation across the two different options.  
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It is possible to discriminate at least preliminarily between these two conjectures by 
looking at the difference in the contributions that go to the local group in decisions 2 and 3. 
Given the nested structure of the interaction, an individual’s total contribution that goes to the 
local group in Decision 2 and Decision 3, is given by ( ) 23122 NLL T +=  and ( ) 33133 WLL T += , 
respectively. If co-operation was driven by altruism, one would expect that these two quantities 
would remain approximately constant across the two decisions. A reciprocal co-operation 
motivation would instead be consistent with a variation in the allocation to these two quantities. 
A two-tailed t-test conducted on the difference between TL2  and TL3  shows that these are 
significantly different (t = 2.5601; Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0120 ), with total contribution to the local pot 
being higher in Decision 2 than in Decision 3. Altruism, then, does not receive support in this 
sense. On the other hand, the reciprocal co-operation idea does not seem to be able to account 
for the difference in overall co-operation rates between Decision 2 and 3, whereas this result 
would be, at least in principle, compatible with altruism. Hence, a tentative conclusion is that 
these two models of co-operation do not receive particular support from these data. To be sure, 
other factors, such as the framing effect given by the polarisation between the local and the two 
different groups at the higher level, and also order effects16, must play a role in accounting for 
individual behaviour. 
4.2 Analysis of the Individual-level Globalisation Scales  
For this reason, and more generally to test the influence of individual participation of 
globalisation on individual behaviour, it is interesting to study the effects that various indexes of 
participation into, and exclusion from, globalisation have on individual behaviour. As illustrated 
in section 3.2, these indexes have been derived from the questionnaires that participants were 
asked to complete before or after the experiment. Questions were designed to capture four 
different dimensions of participation in globalisation, that is, economic, social, cultural, and 
political. Moreover, an index of exclusion from globalisation is designed to capture the extent to 
which an individual cannot engage in relations because of lack of access to means of 
communication, information, etc. The presence of immigrants from abroad and of different 
ethnic groups in the area where the subject lives, also counted towards this index.  
The correlations among the four indexes of economic, social, political and cultural 
globalisation, and the exclusion from globalisation, are reported in Table 2. One can note that 
the exclusion index is always negatively related with the participation indexes, which instead are 
                                                 
16 Order effects did not appear in the 2004 pilot studies, where the order of the then four decisions was 
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strongly positively among themselves. The correlation with other demographic variables is also 
reported in Table 3. I have here used the total index of access in globalisation derived from the 
economic, social, cultural, political indexes. People from the US seem to be overall more 
‘globalised’ than people from Spain. (This is especially true from the point of view of social 
connections). Youngest people also appear to be more globalised. Gender appears to be a 
significant determinant of access to globalisation, with women appearing to be less globalised 
than men. This is true across all of the four dimensions of globalisation that have been 
considered. Another variable worth taking into account is the presence of familiar links outside 
of the individual’s country of residence. As expected, this goes in the direction of increasing the 
globalisation index, especially as far as social relations are concerned. Finally, income is 
positively related to access to globalisation. 
I have conducted a series of ordered logit regressions, having each individual decision in 
the experiment as a dependent variable, and some of the variables described above as 
independent variables. In particular, I have included a country dummy and age, and then the 
four dimensions of globalisation and the exclusion from globalisation as independent variables. 
The results of the analysis are reported in Tables 4 through 6. What seems to be particularly 
interesting is the relevance of some of the four dimensions in accounting for co-operation rates, 
and the fact that these seem to be moving in opposite direction to each other. In particular, table 
4 (columns a, d, g) reports the results of the regression using L1, (L2+N2), and (L3+W3) as 
dependent variables. The cultural dimension is always significant and negatively related to 
individual co-operation rates. The social dimension shows instead some positive, but less 
strong, effects on co-operation rates. In particular, this regressor loses significance in Decision 
3. The political dimension is instead never significant but in Decision 3, though rather weakly. 
The sign is therein positive. Finally, neither the economic dimension nor the exclusion index 
turns out to be significant in these regressions.  
Due to a considerable drop in the observations – some of the subjects are reluctant to 
declare their household income – the control for income has not been included in the majority of 
the regressions. However, when this is done, the above results appear to be confirmed, if not 
strengthened (see table 4, columns c, f, i). In particular, cultural globalisation is always strongly 
significant, and negatively related to co-operation rates. The social dimension of globalisation is 
now significant in Decision 2, too. Finally, the economic dimension of globalisation is now 
weakly significant in Decision 2, the sign being negative. 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternated. 
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In section 2 I illustrated how social identity and culture may mediate the influence of 
globalisation on co-operative decision making. It is then interesting to check for the presence of 
some of these effects in the experiment. We have more than one instrument to measure social 
identity. The first and more straightforward is given by a question drawn from the WVS asking 
which geographical group an individual feels to belong more strongly (see Appendix). The 
options are the locality where the subject lives, the national community, and the global 
community. The other instruments are indexes derived from answers to four questions asking 
the degree of attachment, closeness, identification, and liking with respect to the local, national, 
and global community (see Appendix). The latter set of three indexes has the advantage of not 
asking a ranking across communities, which is consistent with our theoretical framework. 
However, some observations are missing when using this index, so that, for the sake of 
comparability with the previous analysis, I shall use the question from the WVS as independent 
variable. 
The analysis conducted using this social identity measure suggests that this does not 
significantly influence the results obtained above, with respect to total co-operation rates (see 
table 4, columns b, e, h). In particular, social identity is not significant either when used alone 
(not reported) or when used in conjunction with the other regressors (with the country dummy 
and age always present as control factors). Where this measure does turn out to be significant 
is in the explanation of the allocation to the local pots L2 and L3 (see table 5, column a, c). In 
this case, the more people state to belong to geographical groups closer to the local community, 
the higher their contribution to the local pot. This result seems important because none of the 
various dimensions of globalisation significantly affect behaviour with respect to these variables.  
Some further insights into the underlying reasons of these relationships may be obtained 
by looking at how these indexes of access into globalisation affect the allocation into the 
common pots at the higher order, namely, N2 and W3, in relation to the lower order common 
pots, namely L2 and L3. In fact, there appears to be some evidence that these dimensions of 
globalisation affect behaviour mainly in the allocation to the higher order common pot. Social 
globalisation has a positive and weakly significant sign in the regression having N2 as the 
dependent variable (see table 5, column b), whereas cultural globalisation is negatively 
significant with respect to W3 (see table 5, column d). Although cultural globalisation is not 
significant in the regression for N2, the sign is therein negative. Neither of these variables are 
instead significant with respect to L2 and L3. Hence, there are some grounds to say that the 
way the relevant dimensions of globalisation affect co-operative behaviour is through 
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discriminating in favour – for the social aspect – and against – for the cultural aspect – the group 
of participants at the higher order level. 
Another way to control for the existence of effects of mediation of social identity with 
respect to globalisation is by running a regression with social identity as the dependent variable, 
and the components of participation in globalisation as the independent variables. However, 
once country and age effects are controlled for, no significant effect of these variables appear 
(see Table 6, column a), if not for social globalisation influencing negatively social identification 
at the local level (see Table 6, column b) 17.  
Finally, I have tried to verify whether other variables available in the questionnaire have 
any significant effects on individual behaviour, either directly or jointly with globalisation. A 
preliminary analysis does not bring about any significant result. In particular, the measures of 
what are defined as survival versus self-expression values in Inglehart (2003) do not seem to 
play a particular role in accounting for individual behaviour. The same is true for the trust 
measures, and for the questions tapping the presence of anti-foreign sentiments. 
 
                                                 
17 In both cases, political globalisation is significant when exclusion from globalisation is not included among 
the regressors. 
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Correlation Coefficients among Indexes of Participation to and Exclusion from Globalisation 
 
         | Economic     Social   Cultural Political Exclusion 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
Economic |   1.0000 
Social   |   0.5291   1.0000 
Cultural |   0.3785   0.5018   1.0000 
Political|   0.3222   0.3553   0.4934   1.0000 
Exclusion|  -0.3120  -0.4952  -0.5308  -0.8254   1.0000 
Table 2 
 
 
 
Correlation Coefficients among Total Index of Access in Globalisation and demographic 
indicators 
 
         | glob_tot   us       age      gender    famres  income 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
glob_tot |   1.0000 
us       |   0.0514   1.0000 
age      |   0.1969   0.6569   1.0000 
gender   |  -0.1348   0.3245   0.2660   1.0000 
famres   |  -0.4265   0.0330  -0.2072   0.1270   1.0000 
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income   |   0.2178   0.2794   0.2469   0.2605   0.0453   1.0000  
Table 3 
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 Dependent variable: L1 Dependent Variable: L2+N2 Dependent Variable: L3+W3 
 (a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
 
(g) 
 
(h) 
 
(i) 
 
Country dummy 1.53*** 
(0.59)  
1.55** 
(0.61) 
1.19* 
(0.69) 
0.88   
 (0.68)    
0.88 
(0.70) 
0.91 
(0.82) 
1.76*** 
(0.56)  
1.74*** 
(0.57) 
1.81*** 
(0.60) 
Age -.030*   
(0.016)  
-.031* 
(0.019) 
-.025 
(0.020) 
-.003 
(.016)     
-.004 
(0.019) 
-.0054 
(0.021) 
-.035**  
(0.018)   
-.034* 
(0.019) 
-.033* 
(0.02) 
Income   0.067 
(0.093) 
  -.0007 
(0.082) 
  -.093 
(0.087) 
Social Globalisation 4.37** 
(2.03)   
4.43** 
(2.07) 
4.32* 
(2.33) 
5.94**   
(2.92)     
5.95** 
(2.90) 
7.36** 
(3.56) 
3.97 
(2.69) 
3.93 
(2.68) 
5.66* 
(3.38) 
Cultural 
Globalisation 
-4.07*** 
(1.39) 
-4.05*** 
(1.38) 
-4.29*** 
(1.52) 
-2.97** 
(1.31)  
-2.96** 
(1.34) 
-3.88*** 
(1.44) 
-4.24** 
(1.70) 
-4.28** 
(1.71) 
-4.84*** 
(1.89) 
Political 
Globalisation 
1.58 
(1.33)   
1.60 
(1.34) 
0.84 
(1.72) 
0.40 
(1.09) 
0.40 
(1.08) 
0.43 
(1.49)    
1.83* 
(1.03) 
1.82* 
(1.02) 
1.98 
(1.35) 
Economic 
Globalisation 
-0.70 
(2.26)    
-0.74 
(0.26) 
-2.10 
(2.14) 
-3.49    
(2.39)     
-3.50 
(2.37) 
-4.16* 
(2.52) 
-1.45 
(2.65) 
-1.42 
(2.63) 
-2.15 
(2.69) 
Exclusion from 
globalisation 
5.08 
(3.82)     
5.05 
(3.80) 
3.92 
(4.67) 
-0.48     
(3.43)     
-0.50 
(3.49) 
-1.14 
(4.14) 
4.28 
(3.28) 
4.32 
(3.29) 
4.57 
(3.53) 
Social Identity 
measure 
  -.027 
(0.19) 
  -.0092 
(0.19) 
  .025 
(0.17) 
 
Wald Chi² 22.57 22.62 24.22 29.37 29.88 33.66 18.52 18.91 19.00 
Prob > Chi² 0.0020 0.0039 0.0021 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0098 0.0154 0.0148 
Pseudo R²  0.0478 0.0479 0.0550 0.0461 0.0461 0.0623 0.0507 0.0507 0.0632 
N 98 98 87 98 98 87 98 98 87 
Note: Ordered logit regressions.  
Value for the constant has not been reported. Std. errors reported in parenthesis. 
Country dummy assigns value of 1 to subjects living in the US, and 0 to those living in Spain. 
Income is from Question 42c in the questionnaire. 
Age is the year of birth of the subject. Hence, higher values correspond to younger subjects. 
For social, cultural, political, economic globalisation, see the questionnaire for the questions entering these indexes, and for details of how the indexes 
have been constructed. 
The social identity measure is from WVS, question 22 in the questionnaire. 
Table 4 
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 Dependent 
variable:  
L2 
Dependent 
variable: 
N2 
Dependent 
variable: 
L3 
Dependent 
variable: 
W3 
 (a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
Country dummy 0.94* 
(0.55) 
0.53 
(0.62) 
1.11** 
(0.50) 
1.19** 
(0.58) 
Age -.025 
(0.017) 
-.010 
(0.02) 
-.04*** 
(0.015) 
-.021 
(0.019) 
Social 
Globalisation 
-1.80 
(2.53) 
6.31** 
(2.96) 
-1.90 
(2.58) 
4.09 
(2.89) 
Cultural 
Globalisation 
-0.96 
(1.69) 
-2.35 
(1.61) 
-.067 
(1.77) 
-3.82** 
(1.73) 
Political 
Globalisation 
0.35 
(1.16) 
0.06 
(1.10) 
1.08 
(1.30) 
1.13 
(1.16) 
Economic 
Globalisation 
0.77 
(2.14) 
-2.74 
(2.46) 
0.76 
(2.23) 
-1.86 
(2.85) 
Exclusion from 
globalisation 
-3.59 
(3.54) 
1.61 
(3.13) 
4.38 
(3.77) 
0.76 
(3.03) 
Social Identity 
measure 
-0.45** 
(0.18) 
0.07 
(0.19) 
-0.35** 
(0.15) 
0.14 
(0.17) 
Wald Chi² 15.52 9.43 28.36 14.85 
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Prob > Chi² 0.0498 0.3072 0.0004 0.0622 
Pseudo R²  0.0383 0.0237 0.0452 0.0365 
N 98 98 98 98 
Note: Ordered logit regressions.  
See Table 4. 
Table 5 
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 Dependent 
variable: WVS 
Social identity 
 Dependent 
variable: YMBT 
Local Social 
Identity  
Dependent 
variable: YMBT 
National Social 
Identity  
Dependent variable: 
YMBT Global Social 
Identity  
 (a) 
 
 (b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
Country 
dummy 
0.54 
(0.75) 
 -0.15*** 
(0.04) 
-.012 
(0.05) 
-0.080 
(0.058) 
Age -0.042* 
(0.022) 
 0.0020 
(0.0015)    
-.0023 
(0.002) 
-.0017 
(0.0020) 
Social 
Globalisation 
3.21 
(3.07) 
 -0.51** 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.24) 
0.24 
(0.28) 
Cultural 
Globalisation 
2.06 
(1.52) 
 0.12 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.067 
(0.15) 
Political 
Globalisation 
1.30 
(1.45) 
 -0.18 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.28 
(0.19) 
Economic 
Globalisation 
-3.04 
(2.40) 
 -.063 
(0.22) 
0.16 
(0.22) 
-0.226 
(0.20) 
Exclusion 
from 
globalisation 
-2.26 
(5.88) 
 -.007 
(0.45) 
0.62 
(0.44) 
0.47 
(0.56) 
Wald Chi² 26.23 F 6.96 1.89 2.33 
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Prob > Chi² 0.0005 Prob > F   0.0000 0.0810 0.0324 
Pseudo R²  0.0893 R-
squared    
0.2617 0.1359 0.1533 
N 98  97 96 90 
Note: Ordered logit regression for column (a). Linear regression for remaining columns. 
WVS social identity measure is from question 22 in the questionnaire. 
YMBT social identity measures are from question 25-28 in the questionnaire. 
 
Table 6 
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5 Conclus ions 
The purpose of this paper was to offer a work-in-progress report on the GCT research 
project. After presenting the theoretical framework, I have illustrated how the research will be 
conducted in the field. Finally, I have reported some of the results from a pilot conducted in the 
US and Spain on a sample of 98 individuals.  
The nature of this pilot was to test the feasibility of the experimental protocol and of the 
questionnaire, so that the results obtained cannot be generalised. Moreover, the limited size of 
the sample and the fact that this mainly comes from a population whose relevant characteristics 
(gender, age, socio-economic status) have not been controlled for, should make us rather 
cautious in interpreting these results.   
Bearing this in mind, significant country effects seem to emerge, with co-operation rates 
being consistently higher in the US population than in the Spanish population. Access into 
globalisation, as measured by the answers to a questionnaire that subjects were asked to 
complete, appears to have explanatory power on experimental co-operative behaviour. Overall 
individual participation in global relations has been broken down into four dimensions, that is, 
the economic, social, cultural, and political. Another index of exclusion from globalisation has 
also been derived from the questionnaire. The corresponding indexes have been used to 
explain individual behaviour by means of an ordered logit regressions, with a country dummy 
and age as controlling factors.  
Cultural globalisation seems to have a strong predictive power on overall co-operation 
across the three decisions of the experiment. Most notably, the impact of the cultural dimension 
is, ceteris paribus¸negative. The social dimension seems instead to have, ceteris paribus¸a 
positive, though less strong, effect. The other indexes, instead, only have a marginal effect, if 
any, in some of the decisions. I have also pointed out how the cultural and the social 
dimensions seem to mainly affect overall co-operation through discriminating, respectively, 
against and in favour of the groups of people at the higher order, that is, compatriots in Decision 
2 and foreigners in Decision 3.  
I have also used the measures of social identity to test for the presence of mediating 
effect of this variable between globalisation and individual behaviour. The analysis conducted 
thus far suggests that, rather than social identity being a mediating factor for globalisation, it is a 
complementary factor in accounting for individual co-operative behaviour. In fact, social identity 
seems to influence the contributions to the lower order public goods, whereas globalisation has 
a stronger role in affecting contributions to the higher order public goods. Moreover, the 
globalisation dimensions do not seem to affect social identity directly, if not for the social and 
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political dimension with respect to social identity at the local level. In this case, the impact is 
negative. Finally, the other measures of cultural and value orientations, as well as other 
information drawn from the questionnaire, do not seem to affect individual behaviour 
significantly.  
 As stressed above, these results should be taken with extreme caution, given that the main 
purpose of this study was to test the feasibility of the experimental protocol rather than obtaining 
theoretical generalisations. Nevertheless, they seem to give evidence to the relevance of both 
participation in (some dimensions of) globalisation and social identity in predicting experimental 
behaviour. The execution of the project will serve as the ultimate test for these preliminary 
findings. 
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Appendix: Indexes Construction and Questionnaire 
 
 The questionnaire addresses various dimensions in which an individual is involved with 
globalisation. In particular, the questionnaire aims to measure an individual’s participation in 
globalisation processes, which constitutes the main explanatory variable used in the analysis. 
Other aspects that may affect such relations, such as social identity, cultural values, are also 
addressed. Although these dimensions may at times overlap with each other, I have classified a 
question as belonging to only one dimension. Accordingly, the economic, social, cultural, and 
political indexes have been constructed by aggregating the answers to the corresponding set of 
questions. The exception is given by questions addressing what I have defined ‘Exclusion from 
Globalisation’. Since having access to globalisation processes is a pre-condition to measure the 
extent of an individual’s participation in them, several questions address both the existence for 
an individual of the means to participate in globalisation flows, and the extent of this 
participation. For instance, question 1 (reported below) asks both if an individual possesses/has 
access to various means of social connection, and, provided that this is the case, the frequency 
with which this means is used. Hence, such questions count both towards the elaboration of the 
exclusion from globalisation index, and to the participation indexes. More precisely, were an 
individual to answer that she has no access to a certain item (e.g. the option “I do not own this” 
in question 1), her answer would at the same time be classified at the lowest degree of 
participation into globalisation, and at the highest in the exclusion from globalisation.  
 There are various reasons to add an exclusion from globalisation index to the participation 
indexes. First, I already stressed that the interplay between an individual’s exposure and her 
actual participation is key to discern between the two opposing conjectures of identification with 
groups at the higher order (cosmopolitan hypothesis), or at the lower level (resistance 
hypothesis). Second, the way the participation indexes are constructed makes it necessary to 
take into account the exclusion index, too. In fact, there is a substantial difference between a 
lack of access to a certain globalisation process and access with low participation, or even no 
participation with access. However, given the way the index is constructed (see more details 
below), such differences are somehow ‘compressed’ by attributing a one-point scale difference 
to these options, in spite of their substantive diversity. Hence, introducing the exclusion index 
helps take into account whether an individual’s low score in the participation index is due to lack 
of access or to low participation.  
  49 
 Some examples of the way variables have been classified is reported in an extract of  
questionnaire items reported below. The following codes mean18:  
 
[S] = Social Globalisation 
[C] = Cultural Globalisation 
[P] = Political Globalisation 
[E]=Economic Globalisation 
[Ex]=Exclusion from Globalisation 
[SI]=Social Identity 
 
All answers to the questionnaire have been normalized, so that the resulting scores vary within 
the [0,1] range. The original score has been divided by n-1, where n is the number of options 
available in a certain question. In this way, a score of 0 corresponds to the lowest possible 
occurrence of a certain character (e.g. lack of access to communication media in question 1), 
whereas a score of 1 is associated with the maximum possible occurrence (e.g. highest 
possible frequency in the use of a communication media in question 1). Moreover, when 
necessary, scores in the answers to the questions have been adjusted so that highest scores in 
the indexes correspond to highest participation in the globalisation dimension, or higher 
exclusion from globalisation processes.  
 
For instance, in question 1 the scores have been normalized and transformed as reported in the 
table below:  
 
Q1. How often do you normally use the following products or services?   Check one.  
 
                                                 
18 Obviously, such key codes are omitted in the text distributed to subjects. 
 Every 
day 
At least 
once a 
week 
At least 
once a 
month 
At least 
once a 
year 
Less 
often 
Although I own 
this, I never 
use it. 
I do not 
own 
this. 
Original 
score 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Normalized 
score 
1 0.833 0.667 0.5 0.334 0.167 0 
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The normalized scores to all questions referring to a certain dimension of globalisation have 
then been summed up and divided by the number of the relevant questions to which the 
individual has answered. That is, non-answered questions have not been included in the 
count19. Hence, all the indexes vary within the [0,1] interval.  
 As for the multiple choice questions asking the area (local, national, international) in which 
a subject carries out a certain activity, e.g. Q2 (see below), I take into account which is the 
broadest area where the subject has contacts. In particular, I have assigned a value of 1 if the 
subject has international contacts; 0.5 if the subject has national contacts but no international 
contacts; a value of 0.25 if the subject only has local contacts; a value of 0 otherwise. In this 
way we measure the geographical extension of a subject’s contacts in a lexicographic order, in 
line with the definition of globalisation that we are adopting20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the economic, social, cultural, political index of participation in globalisation, an 
overall index has also been derived. Summary statistics for these indexes are reported in table 
7:  
 
 
                                                 
19 In the economic globalisation index, the “I don’t know” answers to the question have not been included in 
the count, too. These may instead enter an ‘awareness of globalisation’ index.  
20 An alternative may be to measure the extent of a subject’s overall degree of connectedness with others, 
without assigning a lexicogrophic ordering among the international, national, and local options. In other 
words, such an alternative index may take into account both the geographical extension and the number of 
social contacts that an individual has at the same time. For instance, this sums the {0,1} scores to questions 
asking the location of a subject’s contacts, multiplying such scores by a factor of 0.5 for ‘local area’, 1 for 
‘national area’ and 2 for ‘international area’. Note that the two indexes may lead to substantially different 
results. For instance, a subject that has contacts only at the international level would receive the maximum 
score of 1 according to the global connections index (the one I actually used in the analysis), and a value of 
2/3.5=0.57 according to the connectedness index. Only if a subject has connections at all levels, she would 
obtain a maximum score of 1 in the connectedness index, too.  
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Variable     |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
glob_acc_tot |        98    .5673294    .1019822   .3186274     .76375 
glob_econo~c |        98    .5897388    .1123778   .2142857   .8802083 
 glob_social |        98    .5556549    .1055538   .2561728   .8209876 
glob_cultu~l |        98    .5312234    .1709718   .0555556   .9583333 
glob_polit~l |        98    .6289456    .2451088          0   .9333333 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
glob_exclu~n |        98    .0992699    .0834918          0   .3214286 
Table 7 
 
As for the exclusion from globalisation index, the index counts how many times an individual 
has reported the lowest possible score in the relevant questions, and divides this sum by the 
number of questions. Note this corresponds to the “I don’t own/I don’t have access to” option in 
the relevant questions. 
 Indexes have also been constructed for the YMBT social identity measures. Scores to the 
four questions comprising this measure have been normalized in the same way as before, and 
then summed. When the answer has been ‘I am not interested in this issue’, no score has been 
added. Summary statistics, and correlation with the WVS social identity measures, is reported in 
tables 8 and 9 below. 
 
Variable     |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    si_local |        97    .7837506    .1938844   .1428571          1 
   si_natiol |        96    .7521081    .1771076   .1428571          1 
   si_global |        90    .6060847    .1993697   .1428571          1 
Table 8 
 
             | si_local  si_natiol si_glo~l belong1  belong5 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
    si_local |   1.0000 
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   si_natiol |   0.5076   1.0000 
   si_global |   0.0746   0.4097   1.0000 
     belong1 |  -0.2852  -0.0619   0.2921   1.0000 
     belong5 |   0.2936   0.0731  -0.2777  -0.5313   1.0000 
Table 9 
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Research Questionnaire (Extract21)  
 
1. How often do you normally use the following products or services?   Check one.  
 
 
[S] 2a. Provided that you use the following products, do you use them to contact people living in 
your local area, in other parts of your country, or people living in other countries? Check all that 
apply.  
                                                 
21 This version has been used in the experiments held in Portage (Wisconsin, US). The items in bold are specific to 
the location where the research is run, thus would be changed in other locations. 
 Every 
day 
At least 
once a 
week 
At least 
once a 
month 
At 
least 
once a 
year 
Less 
often 
Although I 
own this, I 
never use it. 
I do 
not 
own 
this. 
Landline phone [S/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mobile phone  [S/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Internet   [C/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Email [S/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Credit card [E/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Postal mail[S/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A TV  not connected to a 
satellite/digital/cable 
network [C/Ex] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A TV connected to a 
satellite/digital/cable 
network [C/Ex] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Radio [C/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fax machine [S/Ex] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 Local area Other parts of my country Other countries 
Landline phone 1 2 3 
Mobile phone .    1 2 3 
Email 1 2 3 
Postal mail 1 2 3 
Fax machine 1 2 3 
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 [P/Ex] 7. Here is a list of organizations and institutions. For each of them, please tell me what 
kind of influence this group is having on the way things are going in the world.  Is the influence 
very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?   Check one. 
 
 Very 
Good 
Somewhat
Good 
Somewhat
Bad 
Very 
Bad 
I am not 
interested in 
this issue. 
I am not 
informed 
about this 
issue 
The United Nations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Large multinational 
companies or 
companies from other 
countries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
International 
Organizations like the 
World Bank, IMF and 
the World Trade 
Organization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
NGOs--that is non-
governmental 
organizations such as 
the Red Cross 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
[SI] 22. Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?  
 
The world as a 
whole 
 
North America 
as a whole 
The US as a 
whole 
Wisconsin Portage 
5 4 3 2 1 
[SI]  23. Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to next to the 
first?  
 
The world as a North America as The US as a Wisconsin Portage 
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whole 
 
a whole whole 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
[SI]  24. Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to least of all?  
 
The world as a 
whole 
 
North America as 
a whole 
The US as a 
whole 
Wisconsin Portage 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
[SI]  25. How strongly do you feel attachment to your community in Portage, in the 
United States, or to the global community?  
 
 
 
Not attached                                                                                             
Very 
     at all                                                                                                 
attached 
I don’t think 
about this 
issue 
Your local 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Your country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The global 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
[SI] 
26. How strongly do you define yourself as a member of the Portage community, the 
American community, or the global community?  
 
 
 
Not at all                                                                                        Very 
strongly 
 
I don’t think 
about this 
issue 
Your local 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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community 
Your country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The global 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
[SI] 27. How close do you feel to other members of the Portage community, the 
American community, or the global community?  
 
 
 
Not at all                                                                                           
Very close 
close 
I don’t think 
about this 
issue 
Your local 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Your country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The global 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
[SI] 28. How much do you like people from your local community, your country, the global 
community?  
 
 
 
Not at all                                                                                            
Very much 
 
I don’t think 
about this 
issue 
Your local 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Your country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
The global 
community 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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